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Abstract: Economic motives are not the only reasons for committing a
(small) crime. People consider social norms and perceptions of fairness be-
fore judging a situation and acting upon it. If someone takes a bundle of
printing paper from the oﬃce for private use at home, then a colleague who
sees this can either report it or not: peer reporting. We investigate how
fairness perception inﬂuences peer reporting in this situation of incorrect be-
havior.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C35, C36, D63, K42.
Keywords: Peer reporting; Perception; Social norms; Fairness; Employee
theft; Victimization.
21 Introduction
A young boy goes to supermarket and sees an expensive pen which he likes
a lot. He puts the pen in his pocket and walks out of the shop, but the shop
assistant has seen him, grabs him, and hands him over to the police. At the
police station, the boy’s father is called and appears.
Father: Son, why did you do this?
Boy: I liked the pen so much!
Father: But you know you should not steal.
Boy: I liked the pen so much!
Father: Why did you not tell me? I could have brought one for
you from the oﬃce.
It is the father, rather than the son, who is of interest in this story. Appar-
ently he ﬁnds taking a pen from the shop bad, but taking the same pen from
his work not. Why not?
Becker (1968) would explain this by saying that the expected monetary
loss caused by being caught is smaller than the gain obtained by having the
pen. This can be viewed as the traditional economic approach. But there are
many additional or alternative views. Maybe the father’s oﬃce lacks norma-
tive pressure (social norms). Normative pressure triggers guilt and shame,
and this may prevent criminal activities (Weibull and Villa, 2005). A recent
ﬁeld study which relies on the morality of its customers is the honor-based
ﬂower picking business in the Black Forest in Germany (Schl¨ uter and Vollan,
2011). Classical economic theory would predict that this market would break
down, but it does not, even though serious money is involved. So, here is
a preference for honesty in a situation where it is diﬃcult or impossible to
detect cheating. This is closely related to ‘conditional cooperation’: people
are more likely to comply when a larger population fraction adheres to the
norm (Weibull and Villa, 2005; Traxler, 2010).
Maybe the father feels it is fair to take a pen from the oﬃce. Greenberg
(1990) and Houser, Vetter, and Winter (2011) showed that if a situation
(like a pay-cut) is perceived as unfair, employees are more likely to cheat.
Honesty is aﬀected by perceptions of fairness. Or perhaps, the father works
in a disorderly environment. This is the ‘broken windows theory’, which
suggests that a disorderly environment triggers petty crime. An experiment
by Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg (2008) showed that this may indeed be the
case. The father may well work in a large ﬁrm. Gneezy (2005) suggested
that fraudulent behavior in a large organization is considered less severe
than against individuals, even if the monetary damage is similar, because
the consequences of the deception are valued diﬀerently.
3Douhou, Magnus, and Van Soest (2011) looked at aspects of the oﬀender,
the context, and the person judging a petty crime, as possible factors inﬂu-
encing fairness perceptions, called ‘justiﬁability’. In the current paper we use
the same data source as they used to investigate how the decision to take
action (or not) against an oﬀender is inﬂuenced by fairness perception and
other factors, including indexes for trust and social norms. The oﬀense we
consider is to take a bundle of paper home from the oﬃce for private use. We
use survey data from a household panel (CentERpanel) where about 2000
respondents were asked to judge the perceived fairness of this type of ‘small
crime’ at work, and to state whether they would talk to the oﬀender or re-
port the oﬀense to someone else in the same organization (a colleague or a
superior) in this hypothetical situation. This is referred to as ‘peer reporting’
(Barnett, Bass, and Brown, 1996), which is related to but somewhat diﬀer-
ent than ‘(external) whistleblowing’, because it takes place inside rather than
outside the organization (Sims and Keenan, 1998, p. 411).
Studies in the area of peer reporting and whistleblowing have investigated,
inter alia, factors related to the individual, the situation, the organization,
social context, justice evaluation, and ethical ideology and religion. Sims
and Keenan (1998) analyzed a sample of 248 full-time employees enrolled
in an undergraduate or graduate business program and found that external
whistleblowing was signiﬁcantly related to supervisor support, informal poli-
cies, gender, and ideal values. Victor, Trevino, and Shapiro (1993) used a
ﬁeld survey in a fast food restaurant to test the inﬂuences of social context
(role responsibility and interests of group members) and justice evaluations
on the respondent’s inclination to report theft and the actual theft-reporting
behavior. Trevino and Victor (1992) found support for a positive relation be-
tween the extent to which the oﬀender damages the interest of group members
and the inclination to peer report. King and Hermodson (2000) analyzed ac-
tual peer reporting of unethical behavior by colleagues in a sample of 197
registered nurses and found that the observer’s individual characteristics, sit-
uational factors such as severity of the wrongdoing, as well as organizational
issues like compliance or non-compliance with policy and procedures played a
signiﬁcant role. Barnett, Bass, and Brown (1996) analyzed peer reporting of
academic cheating, focusing on the role of religion and ethical ideology, and
found a positive association between peer reporting and religiosity among
267 American business students.
Our study diﬀers from the existing literature since we combine charac-
teristics of the reporter, the oﬀender, and the ‘small crime’, with justice
evaluation and information on a respondent’s past victimization. Further-
more, unlike most other studies, our data set consists of a large representative
sample of the Dutch population and is not limited to students or employees
4of a speciﬁc organization.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2
we brieﬂy describe the survey design and the elements of the survey rel-
evant for the current paper. Some descriptive statistics are provided and
discussed in Section 3. The econometric method is explained in Section 4.
Our main equation is an equation for peer reporting, in which justiﬁability
of the committed oﬀense is one of the explanatory variables. To allow for
confounding unobserved factors correlated with justiﬁability as well as peer
reporting, we treat justiﬁability as endogenous and estimate an equation for
justiﬁability jointly with the equation for peer reporting. Estimation results
are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. An appendix gives details
on the deﬁnitions of respondent and vignette variables used in the analysis.
2 Survey design
The CentERdata research institute at Tilburg University manages a panel
of over two thousand ‘respondents’ (the CentERpanel), who participate in
an online websurvey on a weekly basis, each week on a diﬀerent topic. Re-
spondents are randomly selected from a population register. If they do not
have a computer with Internet access, they are provided with the necessary
equipment. Detailed background information on the respondents is available
from prior surveys and the response rate is generally high. Our ‘small crime’
survey was conducted in the Summer of 2008. A total of 1932 panel mem-
bers completed the survey, amounting to a response rate of about 83%. The
respondents form a representative sample of the Dutch population, aged 16
years and older.
We brieﬂy describe the structure of the survey; a more detailed description
can be found in Douhou, Magnus, and Van Soest (2011) who used the same
data source as we do. The complete questionnaire (in Dutch) is available
upon request from the authors. Our survey was divided into three blocks of
questions. The ﬁrst block consisted of a set of 24 small oﬀenses, ranging from
taking a ballpoint from the oﬃce for private use to accepting a bribe. The
respondents were asked to rate the severity of 18 oﬀenses and the justiﬁability
of six other oﬀenses.
In the second block we concentrated on six oﬀenses: (i) not having a valid
(train) ticket, (ii) breaking a coﬀee mug and not reporting it, (iii) taking a
bundle of printing paper, (iv) driving too fast on a highway, (v) accepting a
bribe, and (vi) reporting a lower income than the actual income to the tax
authorities. This time the oﬀenses were described in short stories (‘vignettes’)
concerning hypothetical persons in a hypothetical setting. Each of the six
5oﬀenses was described in two vignettes with varying characteristics of the
hypothetical person (the ‘vignette person’) committing the oﬀense and of
the hypothetical setting. A typical example (concerning oﬀense (iii)) is:
Anne is 27 years old and works at an oﬃce. She earns A C1335
per month before tax, a low wage for the type of work she does.
Anne has noticed that her boss occasionally takes printing pa-
per home for private use. Anne takes a bundle of printing paper
home for private use. This is the ﬁrst time that she does this.
The probability that someone will notice it is very small. Do you
think Anne’s behavior is never justiﬁable (1),..., always justiﬁ-
able (10)?
In the ﬁrst variant of this vignette question the vignette person (Anne) earns
A C1335; in the second variant A C2500. Both variants were put to the respon-
dents in the survey. Other items were randomized. In this case, the following
six aspects of the vignettes were randomized:
• Gender: Anne or John;
• Age: 27, 43, or 55 years old;
• Boss: occasionally takes printing paper home for private use, or is a
principled man and never takes things home from work for private use;
• Frequency: this is the ﬁrst time or Anne does it often;
• Catch: probability of detection is very small or 50%;
• Wage: low or average if wage is A C1335; average or high if wage is
A C2500.
The associated randomized binary vignette variables are presented in more
detail in the Appendix, Table A.1.
In this paper we concentrate on the above vignette question on taking a
bundle of printing paper from the oﬃce, because it was the only one that
was followed by a question on reporting behavior, phrased as follows:
Suppose Anne/John is your colleague, would you report this be-
havior?
The respondents could then choose from the following options:
• Yes,
6– I would talk with Anne/John about it (1)
– I would talk with my colleagues, but not with my boss (2)
– I would immediately report this behavior to my boss (3)
– I would report this to someone else (4);
• No,
– because I am worried about the reaction of my colleagues (5)
– because I am worried about my position within the company (6)
– because I don’t know to whom to report this behavior (7)
– because this is too futile to worry about (8)
– for some other reason (9).
The third block was designed to provide more detailed background infor-
mation of the respondents. The following two questions about past victim-
ization are particularly relevant:
• Have you been a victim of a serious crime in the past ﬁve years (i.e.,
burglary, holdup, violence, or something similar)?
• Have you been a victim of ‘incorrect’ behavior in the past ﬁve years?
If either question is answered ‘yes’, then a follow-up question asks to rate
the severity of the most serious crime on a scale from 1 (very severe) to
10 (not severe). We used this information to construct an index of self-
reported severity of past victimization. The reason that we only ask about
the past ﬁve years is to avoid a bias towards older respondents that have
a higher probability of being victimized. Since ‘incorrect’ behavior ranges
from stealing a pen to smoking in a public place, it is highly unlikely that a
respondent has never been a victim of this type of behavior. Still, only about
one quarter of the respondents reported being a victim of incorrect behavior,
suggesting that the answer reﬂects the respondent’s attitude or sensitivity
towards social norm violations.
Since peer reporting may be associated with trust in other people (Trevino
and Victor, 1992), we used a trust index as one of our explanatory variables.
Questions on trust were not included in our survey, but they were asked to
the same panel of respondents in another CentERpanel survey, conducted
around the same time, entitled ‘Victims of (attempt to) fraud’ (Oudejans
and Vis, 2008). This survey was merged with our own data to obtain an
index for trust. Three questions were used to construct trust index:
7• Do you think that, in general, most people can be trusted or that you
cannot be careful enough when dealing with people? Please answer
on a scale from 1 (you have to be careful) to 11 (most people can be
trusted);
• Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if
they would have the chance, or would they try to be honest? Please
answer on a scale from 1 (most people would try to make advantage of
me) to 11 (most people would try to be honest); and
• Do you think that people try to be helpful most of the time or do
they think mostly of themselves only? Please answer on a scale from 1
(people think mostly of themselves) to 11 (people try to be helpful).
3 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the respondent variables used in our analysis are
presented in Table 1. Peer reporting and justiﬁability are the main variables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics — respondent characteristics
Binary Non-binary
Mean N Mean N
female 0.47 1931 age 50.68 1931
edu middle 0.39 1924 hh lincome 7.93 1931
edu high 0.55 1924 vict index 1.87 1919
urban high 0.41 1924 trust index 21.69 1635
urban middle 0.20 1924 social norm 3.99 1929
religion 0.58 1932 justiﬁability* 3.19 3840
victim small 0.25 1919
victim serious 0.12 1919
takematerial 0.33 1919
peer report* 0.66 3840
* = dependent variable.
of interest (and the dependent variables in our econometric model); the other
variables are used as explanatory variables for peer reporting, justiﬁability,
or both. The corresponding variable deﬁnitions are listed in the Appendix,
Table A.2.
Our principal dependent variable is peer report. About 66% of the re-
spondents would report a colleague if this colleague would take a bundle of
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(not) reporting
printing paper from the oﬃce for private use. As explained in Section 2,
labels 1–4 in Figure 1 refer to the situation where the respondent decides to
report, while labels 5–9 refer to the situation where the respondent does not
report. Most respondents, if they report, choose to talk to the oﬀender (la-
bel 1). If respondents choose not to report the oﬀense, it is usually because
they ﬁnd the oﬀense too futile to worry about it (label 8).
Our second variable of main interest (used both as a dependent variable
and as an explanatory variable for peer reporting) is justiﬁability, and Fig-
ure 2 presents its empirical distribution. The mean and median are around 3.
Since a low value of justiﬁability means that the respondent does not ﬁnd
the action justiﬁable, the ﬁgure shows that most respondents disapprove of
taking a bundle of printing paper home. Some authors claim that it is the
perceived severity of a small crime rather than its justiﬁability which should
play a role in the analysis (King and Hermodson, 2000; King, 1997). The
relationship between justice evaluations and the severity of a small crime was
discussed by de Graaf (2010) based on interviews performed with employees
of public organizations. He shows that the two concepts are closely related.
The explanatory variables include a set of basic socio-economic and de-
mographic characteristics. The age of the respondents ranges from 15 to 93
with a mean of 51 (Table 1). Median household income before tax was about
A C2780 per month. A slight majority of the respondents is male and has at
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41% live in more urbanized areas (cities, urban high=1).
The other explanatory variables are speciﬁc to the current analysis. There
are three variables relating to victimization. In our sample of 1932 respon-
dents, 488 (25%) reported that they had been victim to a ‘small’ crime (vic-
tim small) in the past ﬁve years, and 226 (12%) that they had been victim
to a ‘serious’ crime (victim serious) during the same period. The range of
‘incorrect’ actions is wide, and this makes it unlikely that someone has never
been a ‘victim’ of incorrect behavior. The fact that only one quarter of the
respondents reported being a victim of incorrect behavior therefore suggests
that the answer may not only reﬂect victimization, but also the respondent’s
susceptibility to harm or injustice.
In Figure 3 we consider only respondents that have been a victim at least
once. The ﬁgure shows that people who have been a victim of a serious
crime in the past ﬁve years typically experienced a serious crime only once,
while the empirical distribution of the number of small crimes is more evenly
spread. If a respondent reported having been victim of a crime (small or
serious) in the past ﬁve years, then the perceived severity of this crime (or
the worst of them, if they experienced more than one) was also asked (on
a ten-point scale: 1 is very severe, 10 is not severe). Figure 4 shows that
a few victims of a serious crime judge the crime to be very severe (1 or 2),
while most respondents ﬁnd the crime rather severe (mode is 3), and only
a few do not ﬁnd the crime severe at all. For small crimes the distribution
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Severity of small crime
is more even, as one would expect. The average severity of a small crime
is 5.3 (median is 5), and of a serious crime 4.5 (median 4). We constructed
an index for the degree of severity of victimization from these two variables
(vict index) ranging from 0 (not a victim of any crime) to 20 (victim of both
small and serious crime and both rated as very severe).
Respondents were also asked three questions relating to their own criminal
behavior. In particular, they were asked about shoplifting, taking materials
from work for private use, and claiming government beneﬁts they were not
11entitled to. Few respondents reported that they had committed these crimes
(which may or may not be truthful), with the exception of taking work
material home for private use (the variable takematerial). One third of the
respondents admitted having done this at least once, and 26% at least twice.
This variable is of interest because it relates closely to the vignette question
used in our analysis, and it allows us to verify whether the respondents’ own
incorrect behavior in a similar situation is associated with their action in the
hypothetical situation.
Ethical judgements of a situation and the reaction to it can also be in-
ﬂuenced by religious views, social norms, and trust. The literature on moral
attitudes suggests that religious people hold more traditional views on moral
issues than non-religious people (Barnett, Bass, and Brown, 1996). There is
reason to believe that people with a religion may respond diﬀerently to an
unethical act (in this case: taking a bundle of printing paper from the of-
ﬁce for private use). About 58% of our respondents reported being religious
(interpreted in a broad sense). Regarding social norms, we constructed a so-
cial norm index as the average of the responses on severity (on a scale from
1 (very severe) to 10 (not severe at all)) of a list of 18 oﬀenses that diﬀer in
the level of damage caused; see Table 2 in Douhou, Magnus, and Van Soest
(2011) for the 18 questions and the mean answer to each of them. The overall
mean (and the mean of our index) is 3.99. A high value of the index means
that the respondent considers small crimes as less severe, indicating a lower
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12Finally, a variable measuring how much trust the respondent has in other
people can be important for one’s actions and beliefs in general (Deutsch,
1958), and for peer reporting in particular (Trevino and Victor, 1992). The
variable trust index is constructed as the sum of three variables, formulated
at the end of Section 2, that measure several aspects of a person’s trust, each
on a scale from 1 to 11 (a higher value means more trust), so that the trust
index ranges from 3 (very low trust) to 33 (maximum trust level). Since
these questions come from a diﬀerent Centerpanel survey, they were asked in
a diﬀerent week, and therefore they were not answered by all respondents who
answered our peer reporting and justiﬁability questions. This explains why
for this variable we have fewer observations. (Respondents who answered
the trust questions but did not participate in our crime perception and peer
reporting survey are nor included.) Figure 5 with a mode of 24 and a mean
of 21.7 shows that respondents on the whole seem to have trust in others.
4 Models
Each respondent i answers questions on two vignettes describing taking home
a bundle of printing paper from work for private purposes. In the ﬁrst vari-
ant (t = 1) the oﬀender’s income is A C1335; in the second variant (t = 2)
it is A C2500. In addition, several other aspects of the vignettes diﬀer in a
randomized way, as described in Section 2. Our main dependent variable is
peer reporting (peer report, yit), and this is a binary variable: respondents
choose to report (yit = 1) or not to report (yit = 0) the oﬀense committed.
Observations on diﬀerent respondents i are all assumed to be independent of
each other, but it is very likely that there is a positive correlation between
the two answers of the same respondent (t = 1 and t = 2), and we shall take
this correlation explicitly into account.
For this purpose, we use the following bivariate probit model, which is
similar to a panel data probit model with random individual eﬀects:
y
∗
it = β0 + x
′
itβ + δzit + ǫit (i = 1,...,N; t = 1,2);
yit = 1 if y
∗
it > 0, yit = 0 if y
∗
it ≤ 0. (1)
In our speciﬁcation there are 21 regressors in the model: the constant term,
19 regressors {xit} (vignette characteristics and respondent characteristics
and attitudes), and the justiﬁability assessment zit, which plays a special












13and also that ǫi is independent of xit. The speciﬁcation implies that var(ǫi1) =
var(ǫi2); the fact that both are equal to one is a harmless normalization. The
parameter ρ1 is expected to be positive since ǫi1 and ǫi2 contain a common
individual speciﬁc component (a random individual eﬀect in panel data mod-
eling terminology).
In model (1) we assume that justiﬁability zit is exogenous. This exogene-
ity assumption is, however, rather doubtful. It seems more plausible that
there are unobserved confounding factors — unobserved variables that have
an inﬂuence on both justiﬁability and peer reporting. This leads to a corre-
lation between zit and ǫit, making justiﬁability potentially endogenous. In a
linear model it would be natural to use an instrumental variables approach to
deal with the endogeneity problem. Our approach is similar in terms of iden-
tifying assumptions, but we do not use instrumental variable estimation as
such, due the nonlinear nature of the model. Instead, we add equations for as-
sessed justiﬁability of the two vignette oﬀenses and estimate these equations
jointly with the equations for peer reporting (using maximum likelihood),
allowing for correlations between the error terms of the peer reporting and
the justiﬁability equations. To identify the model, we include three vignette
variables (a vector wit, our ‘instruments’) in the justiﬁability equation that
are not included in Equation (1), namely relative wage (vign wage low and
vign wage high) and the probability of getting caught (vign catch). These
instruments are correlated with justiﬁability (see Section 5) and they may af-
fect peer reporting through justiﬁability, but they are assumed not to have an
additional, direct, eﬀect on peer reporting (keeping justiﬁability constant).
The plausibility of this latter assumption makes them sensible instruments.







itγ + ζit (i = 1,...,N; t = 1,2),
zit = j if λj−1,t < z
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and ζi is assumed to be independent of (xit,wit). Again, there is no loss of
generality in normalizing the Ω matrix. Like ρ1, we expect ρ2 to be positive,
because of an individual-speciﬁc component in both justiﬁability assessments.
We allow that ζi may be correlated with ǫi. More precisely, we assume that
the vector (ǫi1,ǫi2,ζi1,ζi2)′ is multivariate normal with variances normalized
to one and with unrestricted correlation coeﬃcients ρst = corr(ǫis,ζit). Since
unobserved respondent characteristics that are associated with a stronger
14tendency of peer reporting are likely to be also associated with harsher as-
sessments of the vignette oﬀenses, that is, to lower scores on the justiﬁability
scale (which runs from never justiﬁable to always justiﬁable), we expect the
four ρst correlations all to be negative.
The six correlations ρ1, ρ2, and ρst (s,t = 1,2) are auxiliary model pa-
rameters to be estimated, as well as the thresholds λj,t (j = 1,...,9;t = 1,2).
We set λ0,t = −∞ and λ10,t = ∞. By means of normalization, there is no
constant term in (2). The four equations (1) and (2) (t = 1,2) are estimated
jointly by maximum likelihood using Roodman’s (2009) conditional mixed
process (CMP) routine.
5 Results
We present the estimation results in Tables 2 (for the equation with justi-
ﬁability as the dependent variable) and 3 (for the equation in which peer
reporting is the dependent variable). In the second and third columns of
Table 3, labeled ‘exogeneity’, we assume that justiﬁability is exogenous and
explain peer reporting from the bivariate probit model (1) with exogenous zit.
In the fourth and ﬁfth columns, labeled ‘second stage’, we allow justiﬁability
to be endogenous and present the estimates of the peer reporting equation
in the complete model given by (1) and (2). Table 2 reports the estimates
of the justiﬁability equation in this complete model. Table 4 presents the
estimated correlation structure of the error terms in the complete model.
The number of observations is always 1615, which is lower than the num-
ber of respondents to our survey because we included the variable (trust index)
based upon questions from another survey (see Sections 2 and 3), and not
all respondents of our small crime survey participated in this other survey.
From the three tables, we can draw three broad conclusions. First, most
of the exogenous variables have both a direct and an indirect (via justiﬁa-
bility) eﬀect on peer reporting. Second, the correlations between the error
terms of (1) and (2) in Table 4 are negative and signiﬁcant, conﬁrming our
hypothesis that justiﬁability should be treated as an endogenous variable.
Third, in spite of this ﬁnding, the diﬀerences between the estimates of the
peer reporting equation allowing and not allowing for endogeneity of justiﬁ-
ability are generally rather small. We also note that ρ1 and ρ2 are close to
one and that ρst ≈ −0.2 in all four cases, irrespective of whether s = t or not
(Table 4). This suggests that the individual eﬀects play a much larger role
than the vignette-speciﬁc idiosyncratic error terms.
155.1 Justiﬁability
Although our main interest is in the peer reporting estimates (the second
column in Table 3), let us brieﬂy consider Table 2, which reports the es-
timates when justiﬁability is the dependent variable. The behavior of the
Table 2: Regression results — justiﬁability
vign female 0.014 (0.024)
vign 43y 0.046 (0.029)
vign 55y 0.045 (0.029)
vign boss −0.253*** (0.024)
vign freq −0.188*** (0.024)
vign catch −0.064*** (0.024)
vign wage low 0.073** (0.034)
vign wage high −0.022 (0.034)
female 0.032 (0.052)
age −0.001 (0.002)
hh lincome 0.002 (0.019)
edu middle −0.036 (0.107)
edu high −0.116 (0.105)
urban high 0.028 (0.057)
urban middle −0.040 (0.068)
religion −0.001 (0.051)
vict index −0.007 (0.016)
trust index −0.015*** (0.005)
social norm 0.487*** (0.022)
victim small −0.121 (0.101)
victim serious 0.020 (0.101)
takematerial 0.280*** (0.058)
Dependent variable is justiﬁability;
standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}.
boss is important: if the oﬀender’s boss behaves incorrectly according to the
vignette, then the oﬀense is considered more justiﬁed. First-time oﬀenders
are evaluated less harshly. When the probability of getting caught is higher,
the incorrect behavior is considered less justiﬁed. If the oﬀending employee
in the vignette receives a relatively low wage for the work he or she does, the
oﬀense is considered more justiﬁable than if the employee receives a usual
or high wage (keeping other variables constant, including the absolute wage
level). Both of these variables (two of the three variables used as instruments
16in the peer reporting equation, see Section 4) are signiﬁcant and the three
instruments are also jointly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming that our instruments have
suﬃcient predictive power (conditional on the exogenous variables xit) for
the justiﬁability variable that is instrumented.
Neither having been a victim of a serious or a small crime, nor the victim-
ization index are signiﬁcant, so that victimization has no apparent inﬂuence
on the justiﬁability assessments (keeping other variables constant). As ex-
pected, own involvement in employee theft (takematerial) is associated with
judging the hypothetical oﬀender more lightly. A higher score on the social
norm index implies that a respondent considers small crimes as relatively less
severe. Respondents with higher trust in others (a higher score on the vari-
able trust index) also tend to assess the oﬀenses in the vignettes signiﬁcantly
less harshly.
5.2 Peer reporting
In discussing the estimates of the peer reporting equation in Table 3, we dis-
tinguish between three types of explanatory variables, following the analysis
of Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) in the context of whistleblowing:
characteristics of the oﬀense, context of the oﬀense, and characteristics of
the reporter.
Characteristics of the oﬀense
There is only one variable in this group, namely justiﬁability. We know
from Figure 2 that most respondents disapprove of taking a bundle of print-
ing paper home. Justiﬁability has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on reporting:
respondents who disapprove more are more likely to report (keeping other
variables constant). This is not as trivial a result as it may appear, because
it shows that the potential respondent’s moral judgement is much involved
in the decision on whether or not to report. In our case, most respondents
ﬁnd the ‘crime’ of taking a bundle of printing paper home too futile (see
Section 3), and would therefore not report it. Including justice evaluation as
a possible explanation for peer reporting was considered by Victor, Trevino,
and Shapiro (1993), who distinguished between diﬀerent forms of justice eval-
uations (distributive, procedural, and retributive justice) and concluded that
justice evaluations matter for peer reporting. This is in line with our ﬁndings.
The magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient (−0.161) implies that, for a
benchmark respondent with average peer reporting probability, an increase
of 1 in the justiﬁability score leads to a reduction of 0.054 in the probability
of peer reporting, keeping xit constant. Since the sample standard deviation
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Exogeneity Second stage
vign female −0.008 (0.028) −0.008 (0.029)
vign 43y 0.002 (0.033) −0.002 (0.034)
vign 55y 0.027 (0.033) 0.024 (0.033)
vign boss 0.010 (0.028) 0.029 (0.030)
vign freq 0.098*** (0.027) 0.116*** (0.029)
female −0.160*** (0.051) −0.180*** (0.068)
age 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
hh lincome 0.000 (0.021) 0.001 (0.024)
edu middle 0.156 (0.100) 0.108 (0.138)
edu high 0.229** (0.098) 0.219 (0.136)
urban high 0.008 (0.055) 0.025 (0.075)
urban middle −0.105 (0.066) −0.118 (0.088)
religion 0.023 (0.051) 0.028 (0.067)
vict index −0.022 (0.016) −0.031 (0.021)
trust index 0.013** (0.005) 0.015** (0.007)
social norm −0.043* (0.023) −0.092** (0.036)
victim small 0.337*** (0.101) 0.403*** (0.138)
victim serious 0.226** (0.103) 0.283** (0.137)
takematerial −0.116* (0.063) −0.160** (0.076)
justiﬁability −0.207*** (0.014) −0.161*** (0.032)
constant 0.721 (0.262) 0.686 (0.326)
Dependent variable is peer report; standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ = {p < 0.01}; ∗∗ = {0.01 ≤ p < 0.05}; ∗ = {0.05 ≤ p < 0.10}.
Table 4: Regression results — correlations
ρ1 ρ2 ρ11 ρ12 ρ21 ρ22
Exogeneity 0.97
Second stage 0.97 0.81 −0.15 −0.23 −0.16 −0.22
Dependent variable is peer report.
of the justiﬁability scores is 2.05, a one standard deviation increase would
lead to a fall in the probability of peer reporting of about 11 percentage
points. The eﬀect is therefore not only statistically but also economically
signiﬁcant. According to the estimates in the second column of Table 3, the
eﬀect of justiﬁability would be even larger if we assume peer reporting to be
exogenous.
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The context is captured by ﬁve vignette characteristics, relating peer report-
ing to the hypothetical situation (for example, behavior of the boss) and to
the hypothetical oﬀender (for example, age and gender). Interestingly, we
ﬁnd no evidence that peer reporting is inﬂuenced by the age of the oﬀender,
nor by the fact whether the oﬀender is a man or a woman. The behavior of
the boss does not matter, ceteris paribus. The only thing which does matter
is whether the oﬀender has engaged in this type of incorrect behavior before
or not (vign freq).
Characteristics of the reporter
While we ﬁnd no evidence that peer reporting is inﬂuenced by the age or gen-
der of the oﬀender, the gender of the potential reporter does matter: Men
are signiﬁcantly more likely to report than women (keeping other characteris-
tics constant, including justiﬁability and personal traits like trust and social
norms). This corresponds with other ﬁndings (Near and Miceli, 1985; Sims
and Keenan, 1998), although the reason for the diﬀerent reporting behavior
of men and women is not clear. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect for age. The
literature is also ambiguous in this respect (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswes-
varan, 2005; Sims and Keenan, 1998; Jones and Kavanagh, 1996). Neither
do we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of income. If we assume that justiﬁability is
exogenous then we ﬁnd that higher-educated respondents are more likely to
report than respondents with less education (column 2 of Table 3), but if we
assume endogeneity then this eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant. The literature
on the eﬀect of education is mixed. Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005)
cite studies that ﬁnd an education eﬀect, but Sims and Keenan (1998) ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Whether the respondent lives in a city or in the coun-
try does not matter either. We ﬁnd no evidence that religious people are
more likely to report than non-religious people, possibly because religion has
an indirect eﬀect on reporting, through ethical ideology (Barnett, Bass, and
Brown, 1996).
Trust (as measured by the trust index) is signiﬁcantly associated with
peer reporting: More trust in others signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of
peer reporting, probably because a violation of trust aﬀects trusting people
more than it aﬀects suspicious people. Important is also the social norm
index, which measures the perceived severity of a wide range of situations
of incorrect behavior. We ﬁnd, as expected, that someone who judges in-
correct behavior mildly (high value of social norm) is signiﬁcantly less likely
to report such behavior, keeping justiﬁability and other variables constant.
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deviation increase in social norm reduces the probability of peer reporting by
about 6 percentage points for an average respondent. The eﬀect of the social
norm is much stronger in the model allowing for endogeneity than in the
model assuming that justiﬁability is exogenous. While the existing literature
emphasizes the importance of social context (Victor, Trevino, and Shapiro,
1993), we are not aware of other studies on peer reporting that incorporate
social norms.
New in the literature on peer reporting is also to consider past victimiza-
tion of the potential reporter. We include a victimization index (vict index)
that measures the perceived severity of the diﬀerent types of crime a respon-
dent has possibly been a victim of, and we also include the fact whether a
respondent has been a victim of a small or a serious crime or not. We ﬁnd
that victims of serious crimes and victims of small crimes are more likely
to report. Interestingly, the marginal eﬀect of having been a victim of a
small crime (an increase of about 13 percentage points in the probability
of reporting, for the average respondent) seems to be larger than the eﬀect
of victim serious (an increase of about 9 percentage points). Regarding the
impact on one’s behavior regarding a small crime, this implies that victim-
ization of a small crime has a larger impact than victimization of a serious
crime.
Finally, we included a variable ‘takematerial’ which measures whether
the respondent him/herself has taken material from work for private use at
home. This allows us to see whether a person’s own past behavior in a similar
situation is of inﬂuence on the reporting decision. Interestingly, takematerial
is negative and signiﬁcant, which means that respondents that have been in
a similar situation as the oﬀender in the vignette are less likely to report.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered one ‘small crime’, namely taking printing
paper home from work for private use, and asked whether or not a colleague
would report this crime. Peer reporting is viewed as a behavioral response
to the perception of fairness (i.e. justiﬁability) regarding employee theft,
because it may be considered an additional task for the employee to help
the management or to do justice; see Victor, Trevino, and Shapiro (1993).
We learn about the perception of fairness from the vignette question, where
the CentERpanel respondents were asked to rate the justiﬁability on a 10-
point scale. We ﬁnd that situational characteristics, such as the behavior of
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perception. This perception is also inﬂuenced by characteristics of the re-
spondent him/herself, such as the level of trust in others and whether or not
the respondent committed employee theft him/herself. Fairness perception
and peer reporting are not inﬂuenced by age, income or education, but they
are inﬂuenced by gender: women are less likely to report than men.
The most important aspect triggering peer reporting is the internal atti-
tude towards incorrect behavior. Other important aspects are fairness per-
ception, trust in others, and the potential reporter’s own behavior in a com-
parable situation of employee theft. New in the literature of peer reporting is
that we look at the reporter’s past victimization. We consider victimization
of incorrect behavior in general, and also victimization of a serious crime. We
ﬁnd that the ﬁrst type of victimization is mainly an attitude variable towards
wrongdoings in daily life. The range of wrongdoings a person could possibly
have been a victim of in the past ﬁve years is so wide that it would seem im-
possible to ﬁnd a person that never encountered such a situation. However,
only one quarter of the respondents reported being a victim of incorrect
behavior, from which we conclude that this group contains people with a
greater awareness or sensitivity to social norms. We also ﬁnd evidence that
serious crime victimization changes a person’s willingness to report although
this eﬀect is smaller than the eﬀect of small crime victimization.
We also looked at reasons for people not to report a wrongdoing. The
most important reason for respondents not to report is that the wrongdoing
is not important enough to worry about. The loss to a company as a result
of stealing a bundle of printing paper is considered to be very small. This
is a well-known result: in general, people consider theft from a victim with
larger assets (in this case a company) easier to excuse (Greenberg and Scott,
1996).
We mention three possible extensions. Firstly, one could consider group
dynamics such as group norms and role responsibility. Such aspects have
been found to have an important impact on peer reporting (Victor, Trevino,
and Shapiro, 1993), but they are diﬃcult to implement in the context of vi-
gnette questions, because the description of the hypothetical situation would
become too long and too complex. Second, one could look at more seri-
ous types of employee theft (in terms of monetary losses to the employer),
and ask whether peer reporting happens more often in large than in small
organizations or vice versa. Third, it may be the case that organizations
with an established ethics program have lower employee theft than organiza-
tions without such a program (Greenberg, 2002). Possibly, an ethics program
stimulates awareness to social norms in a company and creates a more open
environment for allowing employees to report.
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23Appendix: Respondent and vignette variables
with explanation
Table A.1: Binary vignette variables with explanation
vign female 1 if vignette person (vp) is a woman
vign 27y 1 if vp is 27 years old
vign 43y 1 if vp is 43 years old
vign 55y 1 if vp is 55 years old
vign boss 1 if the boss of the vp behaves correctly
vign freq 1 if small crime has been committed more often before
vign catch 1 if the probability of getting caught is 50% (0 if very small)
vign wage 1 if vp has a high wage
vign wage low 1 if vp receives low wage for type of work, given vign wage = 0
vign wage high 1 if vp receives high wage for type of work, given vign wage = 1
Table A.2: Respondent variables with explanation
Non-binary variables
age age of respondent (in years)
hh lincome log of gross monthly household income
vict index severity of crime respondent has been victim of (0 if no victim)
trust index degree of trust in other people (0 if no trust)
social norm average of answers to short questions on severity of 18 small
crimes on a scale from 1 (very severe) to 10 (not severe at all)
justiﬁability 1 = crime is never justiﬁable, 10 = — always justiﬁable
Binary variables
female 1 if respondent is a woman
edu middle 1 if respondent’s highest education is secondary school
edu high 1 if — at least vocational school
urban high 1 if respondent lives in an urbanized area
urban middle 1 if — in an area with intermediate urban character
religion 1 if respondent has a religion
victim small 1 if respondent was victim of incorrect behavior
victim serious 1 if — of a serious crime
takematerial 1 if respondent took material from the workplace
peer report 1 if respondent would peer report
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